Wednesday, May 26, 2004
paternalism? social tolerance?
Paternalism is overriding a person’s autonomy for that person’s own future benefit. It can be argued that in doing so, one is acting to satisfy a person’s future preferences, and therefore not entirely overriding their autonomy. This includes cases such as with preventing somebody from committing suicide or taking addictive drugs.
Intrinsic properties are properties that exist on their own. These qualities are such that they are not dependent upon their surroundings or effected by them. These are properties such as the colour, size and weight of, for example, an apple, or that a square box has six sides. Relational properties, on the other hand, exist only in relation to their surroundings and are entirely dependent upon them, such as an apple being inside a box, as opposed to being outside of it or being eaten by a child.
Bernard William objects to the relativist argument for social tolerance by saying that the argument is internally inconsistent. P1: Different cultures have different moral codes and C1: ‘All values, all matters of right and wrong are relative to one’s own culture’ are inconsistent with C2: ‘It is wrong to be intolerant of the practices of those from other cultures.’ This is because C2 makes a universal statement: ‘In all cultures it is wrong to be intolerant…’ The universal claim that is made is directly inconsistent with P1 and C1, which assert that no universal statements can be made. Even given that we accept moral relativism, we are faced with the problem of the tyranny of the majority, as moral relativists hold that what is right in a culture is what the majority of the people hold to be moral truths – this would mean that a 60% majority of people who believed in murder would be justified in killing off the 40% minority that held opposing beliefs.
Sentient beings, whether or not they can be regarded as a person have a capacity for expressing the preference to not suffer. Regardless of who expresses the desire, it is important to give like preferences equal consideration. Humans do not give equal consideration to the preferences of non-human beings. Singer argues that humans, in their treatment of animals, display a ‘speciest’ attitude. Humans give priority to the preferences of other human beings simply because they are human beings. This is an indefensible double standard. This is comparable to white people being given preference over black people two hundred years ago, or men being given preference over women 50 years ago, based on arbitrary judgements about the value of preference based on external appearance. It is noteworthy that Singer is not attempting to argue that it is wrong to kill animals (they exhibit no desire to not die) but simply that it is wrong to make them suffer, as they do have those preferences. He is arguing for equal consideration of interests as opposed to equal treatment. It is also worth noting that in addition to not respecting sentient non-human preferences to not suffer, humans also value the preferences of a non-self-conscious human baby over those of an animal, such as a primate, which could be considered a person by more than just the minimum requirements. We can see this in experiments run on chimpanzees to attain results, which, whilst not necessarily benefitting humans in any way, are justified to humans because ‘speciesm’ renders animal life disposable.
fon @ 3:44 AM link to post * *