Thursday, June 15, 2006
Doctrine of Annatta and Eliminativism
Introduction__________________________________________________________
For the Western reader, it may be useful to begin exploration of the concept of Anatta by comparison to a Western philosopher. Much of what is contained in Buddhist teachings are argued by Derek Parfit in "Personal Identity" (1971) and in "Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons" (1987). By comparing Buddhism to Reductionism, of which Parfit is a champion, we can contextualise the Buddhist doctrines. Parfit likens himself to Buddhist philosophy – in fact, it is said that he considers it anticipatory of his own views (Siderits, 1997, 455). However, I believe that he is wrong to interpret the Buddhist texts as containing any reference to continuity.
In this paper, I shall first explain the doctrine of Anatta as contained within the context of Buddhist discourse, then I shall examine the ways in which Parfit can be said to hold identical views, and in which ways he has differing views or purpose to Buddhism. I will not be discussing the application of Anatta across lifetimes in any detail, as that is a topic that would exclude discussion on Parfit. I will argue that where Buddhism and Parfit diverge is on the matter of psychological continuity. Also, while the Buddhist account of Reductionism leads to the incoherence of even conventional wisdom, Parfit encounters difficulties in reducing experiences further after a point, and retains conventional thought as a useful discursive tool. While the Buddhist can explain the smallest units of existence in terms of causal relations to each other, Parfit cannot, given that he places special emphasis on the importance of psychological continuity.
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